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Katrina's Lament: Reconstructing Federalism 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Katrina's Lament 
The subject of stormwater management raises threshold 
questions about the federal system. Is the regulation of 
stormwater runoff and the environmental pollution it causes 
within the federal government's legal jurisdiction? Is it a matter 
reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment? Or is it a 
joint responsibility and, if so, precisely how is federal and state 
authority shared? How does the delegation of power by states to 
local governments to regulate the use of privately owned land af- 
fect the federal-state division of power? What limits should there 
be on local control of land uses that cause "nonpoint sourcen pollu- 
tion, the principal culprit to be controlled in stormwater 
management?l 
Stormwater runoff is one of the most serious causes of water 
pollution in the United States; in many locales, the contamination 
caused by the runoff exceeds what is caused by more visible and 
direct commercial and industrial facility w a s t e ~ a t e r . ~  Storm- 
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law, Counsel to  the  Land Use 
Law Center, Visiting Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies. 
Portions of Parts I and I1 of this article are adapted from John R. Nolon, Introduction 
to  NATION ON EDGE: LOSING GROUND (John R. Nolon & Daniel Rodriguez eds., forth- 
coming Envtl. Law Inst. 2006). 
1 .  The wastewater pipe from which effluent flows into surface waters is a "point 
source" of pollution, generally conceded to  be within the  jurisdiction of the federal 
government. 'Wonpoint source" pollution includes runoff from the  land during 
storms: harmful substances tha t  collect on driveways, parking lots, and rooftops, (i.e., 
oil deposits under tractor trailers) or tha t  are deposited on lawns, rooftops, pastures, 
fields, and cropland (i.e., fertilizers, herbicides, and pesticides). 
2. See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System-Regulations for Revi- 
sion of the Water Pollution Control Program Addressing Storm Water Discharges, 64 
Fed. Reg. 68,722 (Dec. 8, 1999) (codified a t  40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122-24). 
rls pollution control measures for industrial process wastewater and mu- 
nicipal sewage were implemented and refined, it became increasingly evi- 
dent tha t  more diffuse sources of water pollution were also significant 
causes of water quality impairment. Specifically, storm water runoff 
draining large surface areas, such as  agricultural and urban land, was 
found to be a major cause of water quality impairment. 
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water runs off from development sites-calTying sediment from 
the disturbed soils-and from developed properties, where lawns 
and vegetation and paved surfaces and buildings are loaded with 
harmful  substance^.^ Water runoff from storm events carries 
with i t  algae-promoting nutrients, floatable trash, used motor oil, 
suspended metals, sediments, raw sewage, pesticides, and other 
toxic contaminants.4 These contaminants flow with the 
stormwater from their source to streams, rivers, lakes, estuaries, 
and  ocean^.^ 
The regulation of construction and development, and resul- 
tant stormwater runoff, is  understood to be within the province of 
Id. a t  68,723. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in its 2000 National 
Water Quality Inventory, reported tha t  nationally, of the  total assessed miles of sur- 
face waters, "19% of stream miles, 43% of lakes, ponds, and reservoirs, and 36% of 
square mileage of estuaries" were "classified as  impaired." The Inventory categorized 
"urban runofflstorm sewers" as  the  second-greatest pollutant of estuaries; the third 
greatest pollutant of lakes, ponds, and reservoirs; and the  fourth greatest pollutant of 
rivers. See EPA, NATIONAL MANAGEMENT MEASURES TO CONTROL NONPOINT SOURCE 
POLLUTION FROM URBAN AREAS @JOY. 2005) a t  0-1 hereinafter EPA, 2005 NATIONAL 
MANAGEMENT MEASURES], auailable at  http~/www.epa.gov/owow/nps/urbanmm/pdD 
urban_guidance.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2006). 
3. See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System-Regulations For Revi- 
sion of the  Water Pollution Control Program Addressing Storm Water Discharges 64 
Fed. Reg. 68,722, 68,725. 
Urbanization alters the  natural infiltration capability of the  land and 
generates a host of pollutants that  are associated with the activities of 
dense populations, thus causing a n  increase in storm water runoff 
volumes and pollutant loadings in storm water discharged to receiving 
- - - 
waterbodies . . . . 
Studies reveal tha t  the  level of im~erviousness in a n  area strongly 
- - 
basin development exceeded 5 percent of the  total impervious area, the 
biological integrity and physical habitat conditions tha t  are necessary to 
support natural  biological diversity and complexity declined 
precipitously. 
Id.  (internal citations omitted). 
4 .  See id. a t  68,724 (citing OFFICE OF WATER, EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF 
STORM WATER DISCHARGES: A NATIONAL PROFILE, EPA 84-R-92-001 (1992)). 
5. See PIXIE A. HAMILTON ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, WATER QUALITY AND 
THE NATION'S STREAMS AND AQUIFERS-OVERVIEW OF SELECTED FINDINGS, 1991-2001 
(Circular 1265) (2004). The USGS National Water Quality Assessment Program 
found that ,  
contaminants are widespread, albeit often a t  low concentrations, in river 
basins and aquifer systems across a wide range of landscapes and land 
uses . . . . Nationally, a t  least one pesticide was found in about 94 percent 
of water samples and in 90 percent of fish samples from streams, and in 
about 55 percent of shallow wells sampled in agricultural and urban 
areas. 
Id. a t  4. 
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local governments, under power delegated to them by state legis- 
latures.6 Yet municipal sewer systems collect and dispose of 
stormwater through effluent pipes identified as point sources sub- 
ject to federal juri~dict ion.~ As a result, the regulation of 
stormwater runoff is  confused as a matter of law. 
The debate over the distribution of power within the federal 
system was painfully present during the immediate aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina. New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin initiated the 
exchange: 
You mean to tell me that a place where you probably have 
thousands of people that have died and thousands more that are 
dying every day, that we can't figure out a way to authorize the 
resources that we need? Come on man . . . . I need reinforce- 
ments . . . . I need troops, man. I need 500 buses, man. This is a 
national disaster. . . . I keep hearing that it's coming. This is 
coming, that is coming. And my answer to that today is BS, 
where is the beef?. . . Get off your asses and let's do ~ o m e t h i n g . ~  
A few days later, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfield responded: 
"The Department of Defence is not a first responder. You need to 
be invited."Q A spokesperson for the State of Louisana asserted: 
"Governor Blanco[ I [has refused] to sign a n  agreement proposed 
6. This is a hotly debated matter, of course, particularly when local sources of 
nonpoint pollution enter and affect surface water systems tha t  have been designated 
a s  "federally impaired" under the  Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. $ $  1251-1387 (2000). 
Examining whether and how federal regulations can effectively govern how local land 
use agencies exercise their historically insulated authority to  control private land 
uses is one of the  purposes of this article. The EPA, in its November, 2005 guidance 
document, acknowledges that ,  
[nlational summaries . . . are useful in  providing a n  overview of the  mag- 
nitude of the  problems associated with urban runoff. Solutions, however, 
are usually applied a t  the  local level. State  and local elected officials and 
agencies, landowners, developers, environmental and consemation 
groups, and others play a crucial role in protecting, maintaining, and re- 
storing water resources. Their efforts, in aggregate, form the basis for 
changing the  status of urban runoff from a local problem to  a national 
problem. 
EPA, 2005 NATIONAL MANAGEMENT MEMURES, supra note 2, a t  0-1. 
7. See e.g., Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 840 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. 
denied, 541 U.S. 1085 (2004) ("Since storm sewer systems generally channel collected 
runoff into federally protected water bodies, they are subject to the  controls of the  
Clean Water Act."). 
8 .  New Orleans Mayor Lashes Out a t  Feds, CNN.com, Sept. 2, 2005, http://www. 
cnn.com/2005/ITS/09/02/katrina.nagin/index.html. 
9. Giles Whittell, Warnings Were Loud and Clear-But Still City Drowned, THE 
TIMES (United Kingdom), Sept. 8,2005, auailable at http:llwww.timesonline.co.uWar- 
ticle/0,,23889-1770245-1,OO.html. 
990 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23 
by the White House to share control of National Guard forces with 
the federal authorities. . . [because] [slhe would lose control when 
she had been in  control from the very beginning."1° Following this 
exchange, President George W. Bush noted that "Katrina exposed 
serious problems in  our response capability a t  all levels of govern- 
ment and to the extent the federal government didn't fully do its 
job right, I take responsibility."ll 
Katrina reflected the pervasive confusion that besets our na- 
tion's legal system for natural disaster response, recovery, and re- 
building.12 That confusion similarly frustrates effective action 
regarding stormwater management.13 It also affects surface 
water pollution prevention,14 wetlands protection,15 transporta- 
tion planning,16 protecting the public from chemical hazards,17 
10. Scott Shane, After Failures, Officials Play Blame Game, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 
2005, a t  Al .  
11. Nursing Home Owners Face Charges, CNN.com, Sept. 13, 2005, http://www. 
cnn.com/2005/ITS/09/13/katrina.impact/index.html. 
12. See generally NATION ON EDGE: LOSING GROUND (John R. Nolon & Daniel Rod- 
riguez, eds., forthcoming 2006) (on file with author). 
13. Stormwater management is primarily governed by the Clean Water Act, 33 
U.S.C. 66 1251-1387 (2000). See id. 6 1342(~)  (Phase I and Phase I1 Stormwater Dis- 
I. I,,. ( '  I l l  I I ,  ,I I , . .  '1'1.. 1. 1. 1.11 l..>lll.lll 1.. 1 1 ,  1. I... 1.111, 11.1. l.,l-l.lll 1. . I , .  
1 1 1 1 . 1  . , I  1 I I \ I I .  - 1  . . I .  . . . . . . .  I I ,  I . . .  1 . 1 1 - % -  1 I I I  ,I , I . . - -  
- . 
tions about the legality and efficacy of a program that  charges federal agencies with 
oversight of local land use control which must be exercised in particular ways if 
nonpoint sources of pollution are to be limited. See infra Part  111, "The Phase I1 
Stormwater Management Program: How the Federal System Links with State and 
Local Police Powers." 
14. The Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) program established under the 
Clean Water Act requires states to identify and list waters not meeting federally es- 
tablished water quality standards. 33 U.S.C. $ 1313(d). The TMDL program raises 
the same questions about how, administratively and legally, federal regulations and 
regulators can influence local land use decisions to limit nonpoint sources of pollution 
to the prescribed total maximum daily loads. See infra Part I.C., "Disintegrated 
Federalism." 
15. The efforts of the Army Corps of Engineers to prevent the construction of a 
landfill by a consortium of municipalities in the Chicago area were struck down by the 
U.S. Supreme Court because they affected resources beyond the reach of federal law, 
a s  adopted by Congress. In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United 
States Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001), the Court held that the Army 
Corps lacked jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act to regulate land development 
affecting intrastate, non-navigable waters based solely on the presence of migratory 
birds: "Permitting respondents to claim federal jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats 
falling within the 'Migratory Bird Rule' would result in a significant impingement of 
the States' traditional and primary power over land and water use." Id. a t  174. 
16. The Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Leg- 
acy for Users 23 U.S.C.S. $ $  101-206 (2006), encourages metropolitan planning orga- 
nizations to consult with officials responsible for other types of planning activities 
that  are affected by transportation in the area (including State and local planned 
growth, economic development, environmental protection, airport operations, and 
KATRINA'S LAMENT 
mercury emissions,la greenhouse gas contro1,lQ and the transport 
of pollutants,20 among others. 
B. Integrated Federalism 
Curiously, the nearsighted focus on determining which level 
of government is primarily responsible, or most interested, in  
these matters has obscured the fact that responding to water pol- 
lution profoundly affects and implicates all three levels of govern- 
ment. Disaster mitigation, like the prevention of water pollution, 
requires the careful coordination of the resources and legal au- 
thority of all three levels of government. This article argues that 
the law can be structured to intermediate governmental roles in  
land use control and environmental protection. It describes, illus- 
trates, and argues for a system of "reflexive lawn implemented 
through a n  integrated framework of statutes and regulations a t  
the federal, state, and local levels that allows regulators and pri- 
vate actors to influence and order the regulatory system.21 
freight movements), or to coordinate its planning process, to the maximum extent 
practicable, with such planning activities. Id. $ 134(g)(3). 
17. Emergency Planning & Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA), 42 U.S.C. 
$ $  11001-11050, $ 11005 (2000). Also known as Title I11 of the Superfund Amend- 
ments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), 42 U.S.C. $ $  9601-9675 (2000). EPCRA was 
enacted by Congress as the national legislation on community safety, designed to as- 
sist local governments in protecting the public and the environment from chemical 
hazards. 
18. Mercury emissions are regulated under provisions of a number of federal stat- 
utes, including the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. $ 1251(a)(3) (discussing regulation of 
"discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic amounts"); the Resource Consemation and Re- 
covery Act, 42 U.S.C. $ $  6901-6992 (2000); and the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 
U.S.C. $ $  300f-300j (2000); a s  well as  by EPA regulations. See EPA, Mercury: Laws 
and Regulations, http://www.epa.gov/rnercury/regs.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2006). 
19. See Energy Policy Act of 1992,42 U.S.C. $ 13385(b) (2000); see also U.S. DOE, 
Guidelines for Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Reporting, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,169 (Mar. 24, 
2005) (codified a t  10 C.F.R. pt. 300); 10 C.F.R. $ $  300.1-.13 (2006) (Voluntary Green- 
house Gas Reporting Program: General Guidelines). 
20. Cindy Skrzycki, States Rush in Where the Feds Fear to Tread, WMH. POST, 
Sept. 13, 2005, a t  D l ,  quoting John Graham, the Bush administration's regulatory 
overseer a t  the Office of Management and Budget: 
The Administration generally respects the Jeffersonian view that  states 
should be given leeway to shape regulatory policies in ways that  respond 
to state needs and preferences. However, we also respect the 
Hamiltonian view that, in some situations, a proliferation of conflicting 
state policies can frustrate national policy or interfere with interstate 
commerce and economic development. 
21. The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) recommends that 
national legislatures adopt framework laws for land, resource, and environmental 
protection: 
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We know how to create a framework of laws that link sepa- 
rate but related land use issues and that mediate the tensions 
among federal supremacy, states rights, and home rule. Consider, 
for example, the federal approach to disaster mitigation and 
coastal protection. The Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA),22 
which creates a n  intergovernmental initiative involving federal, 
state, and local agencies in coastal planning and management, in- 
cludes among its purposes the mitigation of disaster damage.23 
The Disaster Mitigation Act (DMA)24 is  a federal law that encour- 
ages state and local governments to conduct disaster mitigation 
planning in  disaster-prone areas-including coastal zones-and 
I.'I.II u i k .  I Y I I  (.I ... 1 1 . 1 1  1 . l ~ -  .,I. . I . I . I .  I I . v .  I 1 1 . .  . 1.111. - 1 %  I I U I . .  
I I I , , I  . 1v11 1 . 1 . .  1 1 . 1  .--11. - .,I. I 1 1 . 1 1 1 1 1 . 1 1 .  .1 I.. 1. . I.. .I\. 
1 1 1 1 . 1 1 %  1 . I l l  I. 1 1 - 1 1 .  1 1  1 ,  . I 1  1 % , . \ I 1  1 .1  ... 1 1 . 1 1  1...11..1,%1..%I.I 5 . l . I .  
l . l - l . l l l  1. II\. I \ Y I  1 1 .  I .,.I I . > I  I 1 1 1 I I  1 . -  \Y111.  111 . I , . ,  1 1 1 .  , . , I  11 
1 1 1 . 1 1  1. I 1  1. 1 1 . 1 1 1 ,  . 1.1.1.1- 11.. 1. 1 .11 .11 .  1. 1  . 1 \ 1 1  1 . 1 . .  1 1 . 1 1  1 I.: 
tives and policies, the establishment of the related environmental institu- 
tions, and the definition of the common procedural principles for 
environmental decision-making applicable to all sectors. In this latter re- 
spect, the legislation oRen covers such cross-sectoral issues a s  environ- 
mental impact assessment, environmental quality criteria, and public 
participation in decision-making and implementation. 
U.N. Econ. and Soc. Comm'n for Asia and the Pacific, ESCAP Virtual Conference: 
Integrating Enuironmental Considerations into Economic Policymaking Processes, 
Framework Laws, http~/www.unescap.0rg/drpad/vd0rientatiodlegaU2F~frame~intro. 
htm (last visited June 8, 2006); see also UNEP Technical Assistance, http://www. 
u n e p . o r ~ d p d U L a w / P r o g r a m m e ~ ~ ~ r W T e ~ h n i ~ m . a p  (last vis- 
ited June 8, 2006). 
22. 16 U.S.C. $$ 1451.1465 (2000). 
23. Congress has declared that its policy for the coastal zone is 
(2) to encourage and assist the states to exercise effectively their respon- 
sibilities in the coastal zone through the development and implementa- 
tion of management programs to achieve wise use of the land and water 
- . - 
resources of the coastal zone . . . which programs should a t  least provide 
for. . . (B) the management of coastal development to minimize the loss of 
- 
life and property caused by improper development in flood-prone, storm 
surge, geological hazard, and erosion-prone areas and in areas likely to be 
affected by or vulnerable to sea level rise, land subsidence, and saltwater 
intrusion, and by the destruction of natural protective features such as 
beaches, dunes, wetlands, and barrier islands. 
16 U.S.C. $ 1452. See also Linda A. Malone, The Coastal Zone Management Act and 
The Takings Clause in the 1990's: Making the Case for Federal Land Use to Preserve 
Coastal Areas, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 711 (1991). "[Ilf the requirements for state pro- 
grams were more specific, the CZMAwould come close to the most controversial form 
of land control-federal land control. The passage of the CZMA was possible because 
the Act required state programs to implement federal policy rather than federal regu- 
lations." Id. a t  727. 
24. Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-390, 114 Stat. 1552 (codified 
a s  amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
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awards them financial incentives if they do ~ 0 . 2 ~  However acci- 
dental the relationship was in  the mind of Congress, these laws 
are linked horizontally: They relate to each other as a matter of 
policy and promote both economic development and environmen- 
tal protection in  similar ways. These federal laws are linked verti- 
cally as well, relying on state and local authority to adopt disaster 
and coastal plans and encouraging implementation of those plans 
through funding and technical assistance. Using their police 
power authority,26 the states have created comprehensive regimes 
for land use control in  coastal zones and disaster-prone areas rely- 
ing mostly on local land use planning and regulation for imple- 
m e n t a t i ~ n . ~ ~  This local authority is  guided, in  turn, by state 
policies and plans enacted in  response to federal coastal zone 
management and disaster mitigation statutes, completing the ver- 
tical dimension.28 
25. The Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 articulates national legislative objectives 
tha t  provide a n  opportunity to enhance local mitigation planning and implementation 
and to coordinate land use planning and regulation to promote disaster mitigation. 
The Act provides tha t  in order to qualify for federal hazard mitigation grants, state 
and local governments must "develop and submit for approval to the  President a miti- 
gation plan tha t  outlines processes for identifying the  natural hazards, risks, and vul- 
nerabilities of the  area under the  jurisdiction of the  government." Id. g 322 (codified 
a t  42 U.S.C. g 5165(a) (2000)). 
26. 1 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF & DAREN A. RATHKOPF, RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF Z O N ~  
ING AND PLANNING 1-7 (Edward H. Ziegler, J r .  e t  al. eds., 2005). 
Police power in the  land-use control context encompasses zoning and all 
other government regulations which restrict private owners in their de- 
velopment and use of land. The police power is inherent in the  sovereign 
power of the  state to  regulate private conduct to protect and further the 
public welfare. Courts have universally held tha t  this power includes 
within its scope all manner of laws deemed necessary by the  legislature to 
promote public health, safety, morals, or the  general welfare (citations 
omitted). 
Id.  
27. States were instructed and motivated to  adopt this approach to land use con- 
trol, initially, in response to a model zoning enabling statute promulgated by the  Ad- 
visory Committee on Zoning of the  U.S. Department of Commerce. A Standard State  
Zoning Enabling Act Under Which Municipalities May Adopt Zoning Regulations (Re- 
vised Edition 1926), reprinted in 5 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF & DAREN A. RATHKOPF, 
RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING app. A (Edward H. Ziegler, J r .  e t  al. 
eds., 2005), auailable at h t t p : / / w w w . p l a n n i n g . ~ r g / g r o w i n g s m a r t / p d ~ t  
1926.pdf. 
28. See, e.g., OR. DEP'T OF LAND CONSERVATION & DEV., OREGON'S STATEWIDE 
PLANNING OALS AND GUIDELINES, GOAL 7: AREAS SUBJECT TO NATURAL HAZARDS 
(2002), auailable at  http~///egov.oregon.gov/LCD/docs/goals/go OR. DEP'T OF 
LAND CONSERVATION & DEV., CHRONIC OASTAL NATURAL HAZARDS MODEL OVERLAY 
ZONE (Jan. 1998), auailable at  http:/lwww.oregon.gov/LCD/HA7/docs/Iand~ 
coastalhaz.pdf; N.H., NATURAL HAZARDS MITIGATION PLAN, PART VI: COORDINATION F 
LOCAL MITIGATION PLANNING (2004), auailable at  http://www.nh.gov/safety/divisions/ 
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This article demonstrates how the regime set in  place by the 
Clean Water Act to control stormwater pollution can be imple- 
mented so that federal, state, and local powers are carefully coor- 
dinated, without the redundancy that perturbs landowners and 
developers and that fuels property rights complaints, litigation, 
and legislation. This article traces the regulatory thread in  the 
field of stormwater regulation from its source in  the Clean Water 
Act through its actual implementation a t  the state and local level 
in  one state, and makes the case that regulatory programs can be 
designed to meet national, state, and local interests and take full 
advantage of the competencies of each level of government. 
C. Disintegrated Federalism 
This article's straightforward description of a successful, inte- 
grated effort to protect federal, state, and local interests in surface 
water protection masks the complexity of the task of coordination 
and stands in stark contrast to the paradigmatic federal approach 
to pollution prevention. A manifestation of this traditional tack is 
seen in  the frustrated attempt by the U.S. Environmental Protec- 
tion Agency (EPA) to control the entrance of point source and 
nonpoint source pollution into surface waters under the Total 
Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) program of the Clean Water Act.29 
The history of the stalled TMDL program is instructive, since the 
TMDL program aims to achieve the same objective as the federal 
stormwater management program that is currently being 
i m ~ l e r n e n t e d . ~ ~  
Constitutional provisions granting Congress authority over 
interstate commerce provide the jurisdictional basis for federal ac- 
tion regarding water quality.31 The U.S. Supreme Court has 
broadly defined this authority, extending federal control over cur- 
e m e r g s e m i c e s h e m / H a ~ a r d M i t i g a t i ~ n / d ~ ~ u m ~ L o c a l  
- MitLPlanning.pdf; Waterfront Revitalization of Coastal Areas and Inland Water- 
ways, N.Y. EXEC. LAW art .  42 (Consol. 2006). 
29. Clean Water Act g 303, 33 U.S.C. g 1313; see supra note 14. 
30. For a detailed discussion of the historical background of the TMDL program, 
see OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY, AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 11-48 (1999); see also Paula J. Lebowitz, Land Use, Land Abuse and 
Land Re~use: A Framework for the Implementation of TMDLs for Nonpoint Source 
Polluted Waterbodies, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 97, 99-101 (2001). 
31. See Robin Kundis Craig, Beyond SWANCC: The New Federalism and Clean 
Water Act Jurisdiction, 33 ENVTL. L. 113, 119-21 (2003). For a recent survey of the  
history of federal water pollution control legislation, see Kenneth M. Murchison, 
Learning from More than Fiue~and~a~Hal f  Decades of Federal Water Pollution Control 
Legislation: Twenty Lessons for the Future, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 527 (2005). 
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rently navigable waters, waters that have been navigable in the 
past, and waters that can be improved to become navigable, as  
well as  nonnavigable tributaries that affect such navigable wa- 
t e r ~ . ~ ~  The Water Quality Act of 196533 required both that states 
impose quality standards for interstate waters and that they im- 
pose pollution controls to achieve those standards, without requir- 
ing methods of enforcing the standards against individual sources 
of pollution.34 
In 1972, Congress adopted the Federal Water Pollution Con- 
trol Act,35 including means for regulating pollution stemming 
from point sources, requiring point source polluters to obtain per- 
mits, and giving the EPA responsibility for establishing federal 
effluent standards for point sources of pollution, administering 
the permit program, and enforcing the federal standards.36 Sec- 
tion 303 of the 1972 Act directed states to set and implement 
water quality standards, continuing the effort initiated in 1965 
under the Water Quality Act.37 The Act authorized the EPA Ad- 
ministrator to set such standards when a state failed to do s~~~ 
and required the Administrator to identify pollutants suitable for 
maximum daily load measurement correlated with the achieve- 
ment of water quality  objective^.^^ For federally impaired waters 
that failed to meet the Act's standards, states had to develop 
TMDLs for all pollutants identified by the EPA Administrator as  
implicated in the determination of such loads.40 The states were 
required to submit to the EPA lists of the waters identified and 
32. See Murchison, supra note 31, a t  528-29 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 
Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824)); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870); United 
States v. Holt State Bank. 270 U.S. 49. 57 (1926): United States v. Auualachian Elec. , , , , 
Power Co., 311 U.S. 377,417 (1940); Okla. ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 
U.S. 508. 525-26 (1941). 
33. Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903. 
34. See Murchison, supra note 31, a t  532. 
35. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92- 
500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended a t  33 U.S.C. gg 1251-1387 (2000)). 
36. Clean Water Act g 402, 33 U.S.C. g 1342; see also H o u c ~ ,  supra note 30 a t  14. 
The Federal Water Quality Amendments of 1972 were not foreordained. 
The product of years of wrangling in both houses of Congress, they were 
resisted strongly by most states, by a wide spectrum of industry, and by 
high-level members of the Administration up to and including the Presi- 
dent. They were enacted because of an  unusual spectrum of bipartisan 
Senate leadership and strong public opinion. 
Id. 
37. Clean Water Act g 303(a), 33 U.S.C. g 1313(a). 
38. Id. g 303(b), 33 U.S.C. g 1313(b). 
39. Id. 6 303(a)(2). 33 U.S.C. 6 1313(a)(2). " , , , , ,  
40. Id. g 303(d), 33 U.S.C. g 1313(d). 
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the TMDLs.41 Employing a n  important vertical linkage, the Act 
allowed states that obtained approval from the EPA to assume re- 
sponsibility for administering this discharge permit program by 
demonstrating that they could satisfy the requirements of the fed- 
eral law.42 
The TMDL program, like many federal environmental pro- 
grams, is directive. It controls lower order influences from the top 
down. The program not only requires states to designate impaired 
waters and establish maximum daily loads of federally designated 
pollutants that may enter such waters, but also imposes on states 
a n  expectation that they will effectively manage both point source 
and nonpoint source pollution to achieve the established stan- 
d a r d ~ . ~ ~  This set of requirements is  fraught with administrative 
headaches and political difficulty. Principal among these is  the 
fact that many of the pollutants to be controlled under the TMDL 
program emanate largely from development projects and land 
uses that are independently regulated by local land use laws and 
agencies.44 
41. Id. 
42. Id. $ 402(b), 33 U.S.C. $ 1342(b); see Craig, supra note 31, a t  122. "Congress 
also sought to induce state participation in this federal regulation program; the  CWA 
is 'a program of cooperative federalism' through which Congress, pursuant to the  
Commerce clause, 'offer[s] States the  choice of regulating . . . according to federal 
standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation."' Id. (internal cita- 
tions omitted). 
43. Clean Water Act $ 303, 33 U.S.C. $ 1313. 
44. See EPA, National Section 303(d) List Fact Sheet, auailable at  http://oas- 
pub.epa.gov/waters/national_rept.control. The EPA promulgated the TMDL regula- 
tions (and the  Phase I1 regulations) in 1999. Writing a t  tha t  time, Oliver Houck said 
of the  TMDL regulations: 
With more than  40,000 listed waters and a t  least 20,000 TMDLs ahead, 
EPA has  clearly striven to construct a n  interlocking TMDL program from 
many parts, from statutory provisions short on detail and TMDL experi- 
ence limited in scope . . . . One is reminded of the  Agency's approach in 
the early 1970s, under the even less elaborate mandate that  it improve 
and maintain the  nation's air quality, in constructing the nonattainment 
and prevention of significant deterioration program of the  CAA. With the 
Agency having thought its way through the mechanics of meeting these 
statutory goals, subsequent legislation served largely to ratify and fund 
the product. So may it be with TMDLs. 
H o u c ~ ,  supra note 30, a t  191-92. Houck praises the preambles to the  TMDL and 
stormwater regu1ations~' these are seminal documents . . . invaluable repositories of 
information," id. a t  191-and writes tha t  
[flaced repeatedly with policy choices, the Agency has proposed solutions 
on the high end of implementation . . . . By and large, the  choices are 
driven by tha t  option which, while respecting the  rights of the  states and 
dischargers to  select their own remedies, will most likely achieve the  pol- 
lution abatement goals of the  Act and, in particular, of $ 303(d). 
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Because nonpoint sources of TMDL pollutants come from de- 
velopment regulated by local land use agencies, the states inevita- 
bly must require their local governments to amend their land use 
regulations to meet TMDL standards or preempt local authority to 
the extent necessary to meet those standards through more direct 
state action. In most states, this type of preemption, although le- 
gal, violates long-established political norms that respect the mu- 
nicipal home rule tradition. 
Largely because of these practical and political difficulties, 
the EPA is  not effectively implementing the TMDL program.45 A 
revised rule was issued in  July, 2000 which required states to de- 
velop clearer lists of waters that failed to meet quality standards, 
obliged them to detail the reductions needed in  both nonpoint and 
point source pollutants, and required them to establish timetables 
for achieving water quality standards.46 This rule did not require 
regulatory controls to be imposed on nonpoint source pollution, 
demonstrating the political sensitivity to local home rule even in  
Id a t  192. Reporting to Congress in 2001 on the  scientific basis of the  TMDL program, 
the  National Research Council of the  National Academy of Sciences noted tha t  suc- 
cessful implementation of the  best available science into the TMDL program "is di- 
rectly related to the provision of adequate personnel and financial resources for data  
collection, management, and interpretation and for the  development of sufficiently 
detailed and stratified water quality standards." The National Academy of Sciences' 
National Research Council Report on Assessing the Scientific Basis of the Total  maxi^ 
m u m  Daily Load Approach to Water Quality Management: Hearing Before the  sub^ 
committee on Water Resources and Environment of the Committee on Transportation 
and Infrastructure, 107th Cong. 8 (2001). Congress subsequently decided not to adopt 
appropriations tha t  would ensure effective implementation of the  TMDL Program. 
45. See Murchison, supra note 31, a t  577-78: 
States and EPA have developed a large number of TMDLs, and that  trend 
is likely to continue until the deadlines established in various schedules 
and consent decrees have passed. But EPA is unlikely to face judicial 
pressure to prepare additional TMDLs . . . . Without the threat that  EPA 
will be forced to prepare the TMDLs if a state fails to  act, one reasonably 
can expect tha t  states will be slow to prepare them for waters where 
achievement of water quality standards will require politically difficult 
choices. Moreover, the courts have shown little inclination to force imple- 
mentation of TMDLs once they are established. Without such judicial 
pressure, EPA is unlikely to require states to establish regulatory limits 
on nonpoint sources for waters where control of those sources is necessary 
to achieve water quality standards. 
Id. For a summary of the  status of TMDL litigation by state as  of October 1,  2004, see 
EPA, TMDL LITIGATION BY STATE, http~/www.epa.gov/~~~~/tmdl/lawsuitl.html (last 
visited June  11, 2006). 
46. Revisions to the  Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and 
Revisions to the  National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in Sup- 
port of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulations, 65 
Fed. Reg. 43,586 (July 13, 2000) (codified a t  40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122, 123, 124, 130). 
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Washington.47 Despite this forbearance, the rule never became ef- 
fective. Congress buried a postponement of the rule's effective 
date to late 2001 in  a military appropriations bill, and the current 
federal administration granted a n  extension until the spring of 
2003.48 In March of that year, the EPArevoked the rule49 and has 
not since explained its future intentions regarding the TMDL 
program.50 
47. Federal courts have upheld the  authority of the EPA and the states to identify 
waterways polluted by nonpoint sources and to identify TMDLs for pollutants tha t  
may enter these waterways under $ 303(d) of the  Clean Water Act. See, e.g., Pron- 
solino v. Marcus, 91 F. Supp.2d 1337, 1352-56 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affd by Pronsolino v. 
Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied by Pronsolino v. Nastri, 539 U.S. 
926 (2003). 
48. Military Construction Appropriations Act, 2001, tit. 2, ch. 8, Pub. L. No. 106- 
246, 114 Stat.  511, 567 (2000) ("%neofthe funds made available for fiscal years 2000 
and 2001 for the Environmental Protection Agency may be used to make a final deter- 
mination on or implement any new rule relative to the Proposed Revisions to  the  
NPDES] Program and Federal Antidegredation Policy."). See also Effective Date of 
Revisions to the  Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and Revisions 
to  the  National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in Support of Revi- 
sions to the  Water Quality Planning and Management Regulations; and Revision of 
the  Date for State  Submission of the  2002 List of Impaired Waters, 66 Fed. Reg. 
53,044 (Oct. 18, 2001) (codified a t  40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122, 123, 124, 130). 
49. Withdrawal of Revisions to the  Water Quality Planning and Management 
Regulation and Revisions to  the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
Program in Support of Revisions to  the  Water Quality and Planning Regulation, 68 
Fed. Reg. 13,608 (Mar. 19, 2003) (codified a t  40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122, 123, 124, 130). 
According to a n  EPA press release, 
The 2000 rule was determined to be unworkable based on reasons de- 
scribed by more than  34,000 comments and was challenged in court by 
some two dozen parties. Congress stopped the  rule's implementation, and 
the National Academy of Sciences' National Research Council (NRC) 
found numerous drawbacks with the  July 2000 rule . . . . 
An overwhelming majority of comments (more than  90 percent) sup- 
ported EPA's proposed action to withdraw the  July 2000 rule. These com- 
ments came from a broad cross-section of stakeholders, including 
agricultural and forestry groups, business and industry entities and trade 
associations, state agencies, professional associations, academic groups 
and private citizens. 
EPA Press Release, Final Withdrawal of 2000 TMDL Takes Effect; Existing Rules 
Make Progress Cleaning Up Impaired Waters (Mar. 13, 2003), auailable at ht tpf l  
yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.ns~lab9f485bO98972852562e7OO4dc686/6Ol385dlf 
25dal2485256ce800824d38?OpenDocument. 
50. According to a Feb. 16, 2005 update to the  EPA website, 
TMDLs continue to  be developed and completed under the  current rule, 
as  required by the  1972 law and many court orders. The regulations tha t  
currently apply are those tha t  were issued in 1985 and amended in 1992 
(40 C.F.R. pt. 130, 5 130.7). These regulations mandate tha t  states, terri- 
tories. and-authorized tribes list i m ~ a i r e d  and threatened waters and de- 
velop TMDLs. 
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The EPA's Stormwater Management Program is  based on the 
traditionally accepted notion that the jurisdiction of the federal 
government reaches and includes the regulation of point sources 
of pollution.51 The regulations apply to Municipal Separate 
Stormwater Sewer Systems (MS4s) that collect stormwater and 
direct it, through effluent pipes, into nearby surface waters.52 
Under the TMDL program, the role of local governments is only 
indirectly implicated in  the pollution prevention program, 
whereas in the Stormwater Management Program it is  explicit. 
The Stormwater Management Program's effort to regulate the ef- 
fluents of municipal MS4s' attempts to control the nonpoint 
sources of pollution a t  the local level that have evaded EPA so far 
under the TMDL program. Nonpoint source pollution originating 
from a small condominium project near a federally impaired sur- 
face water resource escapes regulation today under the EPA's 
TMDL program but will be subject to regulation under its 
Stormwater Management Program.53 
Such regulatory sleights-of-hand are the result of our limited 
understanding of intergovernmental jurisdiction and call for a 
more settled, logical, and integrated approach such as that 
demonstrated in  Parts I11 and IV below. Part I11 describes the 
EPA's Stormwater Management Program authorized by the Clean 
Water Act, which appears to be a top-down, standard-driven, di- 
rective federal environmental protection system. Part IV then de- 
scribes how this regulatory initiative is  being administered in  
New York in  a manner that respects the state's durable under- 
standing of local home rule through its sensitive integration of 
federal standards, state administration, and local implementa- 
tion. First, in  Part 11, we review some theoretical notions that are 
helpful in  framing the debate over governmental regulation of the 
use of the land by private actors. 
EPA, Overview of Current Total Maximum Daily Load-TMDL-Program and Regu- 
lations, http://www.epa.gov/0~0~/tmd1/0verviewf~ml (last visited June 11, 2006). 
51. The Clean Water Act requires a permit under the National Pollutant Dis- 
charge Elimination System for the discharge of pollutants from a point source into the 
waters of the United States. See 33 U.S.C. $ $  1341(a), 1342. See also supra notes 6 
and 7 and accompanying text. 
52. 33 U.S.C. $ 1342(p). 
53. See infm Part 111, "The Phase I1 Stormwater Management Program: How the 
Federal System Links with State and Local Police Powers." 
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11. CAPTURE, CHOICE, COLLAPSE, AND 
REFLEXIVE LAW: THE THEORETICAL 
UNDERPINNINGS OF INTEGRATED 
FEDERALISM 
The disorderly nature and partial successes achieved by the 
nation's legal system for controlling land use and protecting the 
environment raise serious questions about the prevailing ap- 
proach to governmental intervention in  private affairs. A particu- 
larly relevant assertion is that regulatory systems are subject to 
"capturen by those whose interests are regulated.54 Capture the- 
ory originally grew out of the study of the limitations of adminis- 
trative agencies and the comparative advantages of other 
institutions such as courts and legislatures to avoid capture.55 
Some scholars perceive that even these institutions are subject to 
capture.56 Others suggest that the administrative state itself is 
incapable of properly directing private behaviors and that its ac- 
tivities should be substantially curtailed to allow individuals, as 
rational actors, to pursue their own private interests and leave 
ordering to the marketplace.57 Still others believe that govern- 
mental regulation causes regulated private actors to behave dif- 
ferently and in ways that threaten the legitimacy of public 
54. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967~1983, 
72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039 (1997). Referring to administrative agencies tha t  regulate 
private-sector interests, Merrill notes, "[tlhe principal pathology emphasized during 
these years was 'capture,' meaning tha t  agencies were regarded as  being uniquely 
susceptible to domination by the  industry they were charged with regulating." Id. a t  
1043. 
55. Id. a t  1051-52. 
56. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Environmental Law and Three Economies: Nauigat~ 
ing a Sprawling Field of Study, Practice, and Societal Governance in Which Euery~ 
thing is Connected to Everything Else, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 359, 378 (1999) 
("Sometimes the  problem is tha t  the legislature itself is captured by the  marketplace, 
a s  happened during the  104th Congress."); see also DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR 
ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON (2005). 
57. See Merrill, supra note 54, a t  1053. 
Finally, in the period from roughly 1983 to the  present, a new conception 
of the administrative state, which I will call the  public choice conception, 
has been ascendant. . . . Today, the  'public interest' is seen as  something 
more likely to emerge from the  decentralized decisions of individually ra- 
tional actors pursuing their own interest, i.e., through market ordering, 
than  as  coming about either through government regulation guided by 
human reason or government regulation guided by a more genuinely rep- 
resentative administrative process. 
Id .  
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regulation.58 The importance of this insight is evident in  its corol- 
lary operating principle that regulators should carefully consider 
the impact of regulations on private parties and include their in- 
terests in  drafting, enforcing, monitoring, and reviewing 
 regulation^.^^ 
"Reflexive lawn theory is  a response to the real prospects of 
private sector capture of the regulatory system and to dis- 
integrated federalism. It focuses on the procedural dimensions of 
regulatory systems, shifting the emphasis from the establishment 
of rights and duties to embracing the tendency of individuals and 
firms to act in  accordance with established norms.60 This ten- 
dency is particularly strong where the regulatory decision-makers 
have broad discretion. The attempts of federal law to affect local 
land use agencies' behavior-and that of watershed developers- 
in  the TMDL and Stormwater Management programs necessarily 
implicate the highly discretionary local regulatory regime and 
those affected by it. Well-entrenched norms such as the impor- 
tance of local democracy and the historical hegemony of local gov- 
ernments regarding local development explain the resistance of 
local governments to attempts to control their behavior from the 
top down by higher levels of government.'jl 
Reflexive law draws its name from the basic notion that law 
can encourage "self-critical reflectionn within institutions, such as 
governments and private firms, about their performance.62 This 
theory promotes the creation of legal procedures, such as the re- 
58. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2029 (2005). 
59. "[Cloncerns about the ability of industry to capture agencies and growing 
skepticism about the value of expertise contributed to the development of an  alterna- 
tive [theoretical] model. In the new interest-representation model, the legitimacy of 
agency action was thought to be a function of agencies' ability to replicate the electo- 
ral process through interest group representation." Id. a t  2036. 
60. See, e.g., Tim Iglesias, Housing Impact Assessments: Opening New Doors for 
State Housing Regulation While Localism Persists, 82 OR. L. REV. 433, 496-501 
(2003). 
61. "[Rlegulation of land use [is] a function traditionally performed by local gov- 
ernments." Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994). 
62. See Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Enuironmental Law, 89 Nw. U .  L. REV. 1227,1254- 
55 I . ,I.,. 1;,,,.,1.., 'l'%,,l ,.%I.. <,,I  ..,,,,, ,. ,, , /i.,l 1 0 .  I,,'/ .,,., ,.. ,, . I / , , / . , .  
I ,  I I . .  . 5 , I 2 :  I 'I'l.. 1. I,.. "1. ,1.\1\. I.,\Y".,I I..,,. I .,-..,,I\.,- 
. . 
1983 in an  article by German sociologist Gunther Teubner that  examined the evolu- 
tion of legal systems. He saw a reflexive legal system as a valuable means of mediat- 
ing the complex nature of contemporary society and as an  improvement over earlier 
concepts of law that primarily set rules governing the interactions of autonomous pri- 
vate actors or directed private and public actions to accomplish legally established 
outcomes). 
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quirement of a n  environmental impact statement, that cause in- 
stitutions and actors to reflect on the impacts of what they propose 
to do. At the local level, procedures that cause local land use agen- 
cies and regulated developers to identify and mitigate the impact 
of proposed developments on surface water quality implement re- 
flexive law theory. So do state requirements that encourage local 
governments to examine whether their land use regulations prop- 
erly mitigate the impact of land development on water quality and 
to assess the costs of failing to have proper protections in place. 
The emphasis of reflexive law devices is  on creating norm-consis- 
tent procedures that cause public officials to actively consider 
matters of public importance, rather than on standard-based reg- 
ulations that trigger comply-or-defy responses.63 
In his book Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed, 
Jared Diamond reflects on the costs to society caused by ignoring 
early warnings of long-term problems, such as those caused by 
major natural disasters, surface water pollution, and other serious 
damage to the physical e n v i r ~ n m e n t . ~ ~  He describes how ancient 
and contemporary societies either disappeared or were signifi- 
cantly damaged by rigid adherence to cultural values in  the face of 
drastic environmental change.65 His paradigmatic story is  that of 
the Norse colonies in Greenland that lasted for 450 years and then 
vanished.66 They simply and fatally assumed that Greenland's 
ecosystem would perpetually support their approach to livestock- 
63. See Iglesias, supra note 60, a t  496-510. Iglesias suggests the  intriguing idea 
of requiring local governments to  conduct periodic housing impact analyses as  a 
method of causing local officials, in their established role as  guardian of local re- 
sidents' interests, to reexamine their land use laws to determine whether they meet 
existing housing needs. The procedures would require localities themselves to  gener- 
a te  information regarding housing needs, evaluate the  impacts of current zoning stan- 
dards on housing affordability, and consider the adoption of workable methods of 
- - 
new norms into the local conversation: the  importance of meeting local housing needs 
and the  ability of local regulation to  influence the  provision of affordable housing. 
"Enforcement" of the norm of meeting housing needs is influenced and directed by the  
participants in the  impact analysis itself: residential developers, senior citizen 
groups, housing advocates, employers in need of work force housing, etc. Local offi- 
cials are more likely to  yield to these influences than  to top-down directed inclusion- 
ary zoning mandates simply because they arise within a legal system that  conforms to  
and respects their normative understanding of their role and the proper process of 
decision making. 
64. JARED JAMOND, COLLAPSE: HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR SUCCEED 
(2005). 
65. Id. a t  523. 
66. Id. a t  178-276. 
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based agriculture. They cleared meadows, pastured cattle, grew 
hay to feed their livestock during long winters, dug sod to build 
comfortable houses, and ate beef as their principal staple. They 
continued these practices even after evidence of environmental ca- 
tastrophe was upon them.67 In this and many other stories, Dia- 
mond provides sobering evidence that human beings, pursuing 
their self-interests, are not rational actors and, in the normal 
course of events, their unmediated interactions in  the market- 
place do not insulate societies from environmental devastation or, 
in  some cases, extinction. 
Despite the evidence he marshals regarding the prospects of 
societal collapse, Diamond ends his book on a n  optimistic note. 
Societies, as the book's title implies, can choose to succeed. One of 
the choices necessary for success, he posits, is to make a commit- 
ment to "practice long-term thinking, and to make bold, coura- 
geous, anticipatory decisions a t  a time when problems have 
become perceptible but before they have reached crisis propor- 
tions."68 He writes, somewhat tentatively, that "courageous, suc- 
cessful, long-term planning also characterizes some governments 
and some political leaders, some of the time."eQ 
Is this what occurred when Congress adopted the CZMA and 
DMA and then linked them as a framework for disaster mitigation 
and coastal protection? How can the legal system be used to en- 
courage latter-day Norse to reflect upon their circumstances? Can 
the law be structured to integrate and order the conflicting influ- 
ences of various levels of government and the forces of the private 
market? Do we leave critical environmental and land use choices 
to the serendipitous consequences of unmediated actors in the 
marketplace, support top-down, command-and-control federal so- 
lutions, or develop a legal system that mediates governmental and 
67. Diamond describes the work of anthropologists who explored these abandoned 
settlements and found the  bones of newborn calves, mother cows, and pets consumed 
during the  final winter. From this he concludes that ,  until the  bitter end, the  Norse 
clung to their environmentally destructive diet despite the  abundance of seals and 
fish which were consumed by the Inuits who inhabited the  same environment. Hunt- 
ing seal, consuming the  meat, and burning the blubber for heat and light were anath- 
ema to the  Norse. Their commitment to European agriculture and the  raising and 
consumption of beef was a cultural value too dear to be abandoned. Diamond dis- 
cusses the "landscape amnesia" tha t  must have beset the  Norse. rls a result, they 
forgot to  pay attention to what they were doing to their environment. In  the  end, they 
starved to death. Id. a t  425-26. 
68. Id. a t  522. 
69. Id. a t  523. 
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private sector influences? How do we conduct the long-term plan- 
ning and choice reckoning that characterize successful societies? 
Here again, reflexive law concepts provide clues for proceed- 
ing. Substantive legal standards and rules are indispensable 
within the legal system, and they may be adopted a t  the federal, 
state, or local level. These standards, however, are most effec- 
tively implemented within a somewhat decentralized system that 
encourages agencies and private actors to respond and conform 
their behavior in  ways appropriate to their unique situation.70 
Such a process is  evident in  the unique manner in which the fed- 
eral Stormwater Management Program is  being implemented in  
New York State, as discussed below in  Part IV. To fully under- 
stand New York's responsive law approach, i t  is  first necessary to 
describe the federal system of stormwater management and regu- 
lation and how i t  became linked with state and local authority to 
regulate land use. 
111. THE PHASE I1 STORMWATER MANAGEMENT 
PROGRAM: HOW THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 
LINKS WITH STATE AND LOCAL POLICE 
POWERS 
A. Background o n  Federal Stormwater Regulations 
Pursuant to its authority under the Clean Water Act,71 the 
EPA promulgated regulations establishing a Stormwater Manage- 
ment Program, to be implemented in two phases. Phase I regula- 
tions affected medium and large local governments that own and 
operate Municipal Separate Storm Sewer Systems (MS4s).72 Be- 
ginning in  1990, these municipalities were required to implement 
stormwater management programs as a means of controlling pol- 
luted discharges from their stormwater sewer systems.73 
70. See GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM 67 (1993). 
[Slubstantive legal norms remain indispensable. I t  is only tha t  the pro- 
cess of their production and justification has  to give way to a 'socially 
adequate' proceduralization . . . . The question is whether we are dealing 
with command and control regulation through state economic policy or 
with regulation through decentralized mechanisms of self-regulation. In  
the latter case, the  law of the state regulates only the contextual 
conditions. 
71. 33 U.S.C. g 1342(p) (2000). 
72. National Pollution Discharge Elimination System Permit Application Regula- 
tions for Storm Water Discharges, 55 Fed. Reg. 47,990 (Nov. 16, 1990) (codified a t  40 
C.F.R. pts. 122, 123, 124). 
73. Id. 
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In 1999, the EPA promulgated the second phase of its MS4 
regulatory pr0gram.7~ Under the Phase I1 regulations, local and 
state governments are required to enact and enforce stormwater 
management programs regulating illicit discharges and 
stormwater runoff from development projects.75 Phase I1 regula- 
tions apply to local governments that operate storm sewer sys- 
tems that discharge to federally protected ~ a t e r s . 7 ~  The 
regulations require affected localities to reduce discharges from 
areas of new development, including construction activities that 
disturb land areas as  small as  one acre.77 Phase I1 regulates oper- 
ators of municipal stormwater systems within "urbanized ar- 
e a ~ . " ~ ~  Typically, the municipality itself is the system operator. 
On the basis of the 2000 census, New York, for example, has over 
425 municipalities automatically obliged to control stormwater 
runoff under the Phase I1 program, including 16 urbanized areas, 
which include 27 cities, 203 villages, and 195 towns.7g 
The Phase I1 regulations directly implicate the means by 
which local governments regulate private land use and construc- 
tion activities.80 By attempting to direct the exercise of this local 
land use authority, the regulations challenge the historical and 
political understanding that the federal government may not in- 
terfere with state and local prerogatives to regulate private land 
u ~ e . 8 ~  The Clean Water Act itself expresses Congress's policy "to 
74. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System-Regulations for Revision 
of the Water Pollution Control Program Addressing Storm Water Discharges, 64 Fed. 
Reg. 68,722 (Dec. 8, 1999) (codified a t  40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122, 123, 124). 
75. See 40 C.F.R. g 122.26(a)(9)(i) (2004). 
76. Id. g 122.26(b)(16). 
77. Id. g 122.34(b)(4). 
78. Id. g 122 apps. F-I. 
79. See N.Y. DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, LIST OF NYS MUNICIPALITIES  AUTO^ 
MATICALLY SUBJECT TO PHME I1 REGULATIONS, httpY1www.dec.state.ny.uslweb~itel 
dow1urbanlst.htm (last visited June  11. 2006): see also N.Y. DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSER~ 
dowlMS4crit.pdf. 
80. The only way tha t  local governments can feasibly control stormwater runoff is 
" " 
to  adopt new regulations altering their process of reviewing land development. 
81. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457-58 (1991). 
[Olur Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the 
States and the Federal Government. 
. . . . 
The Constitution created a Federal Government of limited powers. "The 
powers not delegated to the  United States by the  Constitution . . . are 
reserved to the States respectively, or to  the  people." U.S. Const., Amdt. 
10. The States thus retain substantial sovereign authority under our con- 
stitutional system. As James Madison put it: 
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recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and 
rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, to 
plan the development and use (including restoration, preserva- 
tion, and enhancement) of land and water resources, and to con- 
sult with the Administrator in  the exercise of his authority under 
this chapter."82 The tension between the state and local power to 
regulate nonpoint sources of pollution and the power of Congress 
to regulate them indirectly under the Stormwater Management 
Program was addressed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In 
Environmental Defense Center u. EPA,83 the court upheld the 
EPA's statutory authority to regulate municipal MS4s and re- 
jected a Tenth Amendment challenge to the Phase I1 regulations 
brought by affected municipalities, among others.84 
B. EPA's Phase I1 Regulations 
Phase I1 regulates small MS4s as well as small construction 
activities, i.e., activities disturbing between one and five acres of 
land.85 Pursuant to these rules, municipalities that operate regu- 
lated MS4s86 are required to obtain either a n  individual or a gen- 
eral National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) 
point source discharge permit.87 The Phase I1 program requires 
affected municipalities to reduce pollution to the maximum extent 
practicable (MEP), protect water quality, and comply with appli- 
cable water quality requirements of the Clean Water 
"The powers delegated . . . to the federal government are few and 
defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numer- 
ous and indefinite . . . . The powers reserved to the several States will 
extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern 
the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, 
improvement, and prosperity of the State." 
Id .  (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at  292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961)). 
82. Clean Water Act g 101, 33 U.S.C. g 1251(b). 
83. Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 
U.S. 1085 (2004). 
84. See i n fm  Part III.C., "Federal Jurisdiction Sustained: Enuironmentul Defense 
Center u. EPA." 
85. 40 C.F.R. g 122.26(b)(15) (2006). 
86. Regulated small MS4s are designated automatically according to EPA popula- 
tion and density criteria, or may be designated under additional criteria developed by 
the NPDES permitting authority. See id. g 122.32(a)-(b). 
87. See id. g g  122.21, 122.26(a)(3), 122.28(b)(3), 122.33(a)-(b). 
88. Id. g 122.34(a). 
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Best management practices are utilized to achieve the goal of 
reducing pollutants in ~ t o r m w a t e r . ~ ~  To ensure that municipal 
operators meet the MEP standard, the EPA regulations set forth 
six minimum control measures that a locally-adopted manage- 
ment plan must include.QO These include public educationgl and 
participationQ2 programs, pollution prevention programs,Q3 initia- 
tives to detect and eliminate illicit discharges,Q4 and programs 
that mitigate stormwater runoff from construction sites95 and reg- 
ulate runoff due to post-construction land uses.Q6 
The effect on local land use autonomy is evident in the fine 
print of the regulations. Local governments are required to adopt 
erosion and sedimentation control laws,Q7 establish site plan re- 
view procedures for projects that will impact water quality,Q8 in- 
spect construction a c t i v i t i e ~ , ~ ~  a n d  adopt enforcement 
measures.loO Post-construction runoff controls are also required 
for development and redevelopment projects.lOl Redevelopment is 
defined to include any change in the footprint of existing buildings 
that disturbs greater than one acre of land.102 
Further, non-structural best management practices noted in 
the federal regulations include comprehensive planning and zon- 
ing ordinances that guide growth away from sensitive areas and 
that restrict industrial and other intense land uses that compro- 
mise water quality.103 Zoning measures targeted by the regula- 
tions include requiring buffer strips, designating riparian 
preservation zones, and maximizing open space.lo4 It is evident 
that the federal Phase I1 program is clearly designed to influence, 
if not direct, affected municipalities in their use of traditional land 
use control techniques. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. $ 122.34(a)-(b). 
91. Id. $ 122.34(b)(l). 
92. Id. $ 122.34(b)(2). 
93. Id. $ 122.34(b)(6). 
94. Id. $ 122.34(b)(3). 
95. Id. $ 122.34(b)(4). 
96. Id. $ 122.34(b)(5). 
97. Id. $ 122,34(b)(4)(ii)(A). 
98. Id. $ 122,34(b)(4)(ii)(D). 
99. Id. $ 122,34(b)(4)(ii)(F). 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 5 122.34(b)(5)(i). 
102. Id. 
103. See id. $ 122.34(b)(5)(iii) 
104. Id. 
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C. Federal Jurisdiction Sustained: Environmental 
Defense Center u. EPA 
In 2003, the EPA's authority to issue its Phase I1 regulations 
was challenged on Tenth Amendment grounds in  Environmental 
Defense Center u. EPA.lo5 Municipal petitioners contended that 
the agency lacked statutory authority to require local govern- 
ments to regulate private land uses to achieve federal objectiveslo6 
and that the regulations require state and local governments to 
regulate their own citizens in  violation of the Tenth 
Amendment. lo7 
The petitioners included municipal organizations, industrial 
organizations, and environmental organizations.lo8 Municipal pe- 
titioners asserted that the EPA lacked the requisite statutory and 
constitutional authority to compel small MS4s (consisting 
predominantly of state agencies and local governments) to regu- 
late third parties.log Environmental petitioners contended that 
the regulations contained inadequate regulatory and public over- 
sight and that they were "arbitrary and capriciousn in  regard to 
the specific pollutants monitored.110 Industrial petitioners argued 
that the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in determining 
which sources to regulate, and that the EPA's retention of author- 
ity to designate future sources for stormwater regulation was im- 
proper.ll1 In 2003, the Ninth Circuit issued its decision, 
essentially affirming the EPA's regulations against the com- 
plaints of all three groups of petitioners.112 
105. Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 
U.S. 1085 (2004). 
106. Id. a t  843. "The Municipal Petitioners assert tha t  the  statutory command in 
Clean Water Act $ 402(p)(6) tha t  EPA develop a 'comprehensive program to  regulate' 
small MS4s did not authorize a program based on NPDES permits." Id. 
107. Id. a t  844-45. 
Noting tha t  most MS4s are operated by municipal governments, and tha t  
"the drainage of a city in the  interest of the  public health and welfare is 
one of the most imuortant Duruoses for which the  nolice Dower can be 
. . 
\ . I . , - .  I." 1 1 . .  \ 1 1 . 1 . 1 . . 1  .,I 1..1111 1.. 1 -  . 1 , > I I .  1 1 . 1 1  1. ,111111. 1 .  1 1 1  I -  1 
I I I , . ,  1. I... 1.1 "11.1 11.1 1 1 1 1 . 1 1 . .  1 I I .1 1.,11..11 I \  I . . .  1 . I -  
- - 
nism" the  regulations required by the  Minimum Measures contravenes 
the Tenth Amendment. 
Id. a t  846 (internal citations omitted). 




112. Id. a t  840 ("We remand three aspects of the Rule concerning the issuance of 
notices of intent under the  Rule's general permitting scheme, and a fourth aspect 
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The court addressed the municipal petitioners' argument that 
the "measures regulating illicit discharges, small construction 
sites, and development activities unconstitutionally compel small 
MS4 operators to regulate third parties,"l13 in violation of the 
Tenth Amendment. The court relied upon two factors to find that 
the Phase I1 rule did not contravene the Tenth Amendment. 
First, the Phase I1 rule regulates only local governments that 
choose to engage in activities that are legitimately regulated by 
the federal government.l14 Second, the regulations are not coer- 
cive because they provide local governments alternatives to regu- 
lating private construction activities.l15 These include not 
discharging into federal waters, constructing artificial wetlands or 
other detention or diversion structures, sealing off the entry 
points of illicit discharges, or simply requesting private discharg- 
ers to seek their own federal pollution discharge elimination 
permits.l16 
Municipal petitioners had argued that the practical difficul- 
ties involved in these alternatives would force them to adopt a reg- 
ulatory approach, indirectly compelling them to administer a 
federal regulatory program in contravention of the Tenth Amend- 
ment.l17 In response, the court stated that 
while the federal government may not compel them to do so, it 
may encourage States and municipalities to implement federal 
regulatory programs . . . . The crucial proscribed element is co- 
concerning the  regulation of forest roads. We affirm the  Rule against all other chal- 
lenges.") The initial decision, issued in January, 2003, stated tha t  under the  Clean 
Water Act operators of small MS4s must not only comply with "the general effluent 
limitations of the Clean Water Act" but  also "reduce the discharge of pollutants to  the  
maximum extent practicable." Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 319 F.3d 398, 424 (9th 
Cir. 2003), vacated, 344 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2003). The substitute opinion, issued in 
September, 2003, states only tha t  under the  Clean Water Act operators of small MS4s 
must "reduce the  discharee of ~o l l u t an t s  to the maximum extent ~racticable." 344 
114. Id. a t  847. 
115. Id. a t  848. 
Any operator of a small MS4 tha t  wishes to avoid the  Minimum Measures 
may seek a permit under g 122.26(d) [the Alternative Permit option], and 
. . . nothing in g 122.26(d) will compel the  operator of a small MS4 to 
implement a federal regulatory program or regulate third parties . . . . 
Therefore, by presenting the  option of seeking a permit under g 122.26(d), 
the Phase I1 Rule avoids any unconstitutional coercion. 
Id. 
116. John R. Nolon, Local Land Use: Decision Expands Federal Government's Role, 
229 N.Y.L.J. 5 (Apr. 16, 2003). 
117. 344 F.3d 832, 846. 
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ercion; the residents of the State or municipality must retain 
'the ultimate decision' as to whether or not the State or munici- 
pality will comply with the federal regulatory program.l18 
Simply because the alternatives to disposal in  federal waters may 
be more expensive does not affect the ability of municipalities to 
choose not to discharge into federal waters. 
As a result of this decision, local governments operating MS4s 
are required to develop, implement, and enforce programs that 
mitigate stormwater runoff from construction activities and new 
and redevelopment projects. This, then, requires affected local 
governments to regulate nonpoint sources of pollution which they 
can only do by using their traditional land use control authority. 
This judicial endorsement of the Phase I1 Program helped the 
EPA clear a huge hurdle: the claim that requiring municipalities 
to regulate nonpoint source pollution is  beyond the jurisdiction of 
a federal agency. Whether the Phase I1 Program clears the addi- 
tional political and administrative hurdles that have obstructed 
the effective enforcement of the TMDL program may well depend 
on how the Phase I1 Program is  administered a t  the state level. 
IV. NEW YORK STATE CASE STUDY 
The New York State Department of Environmental Conserva- 
tion (DEC) incorporated the Phase I1 regulations as part of its 
State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (SPDES) program 
and issued regulations in  January 2003 that impose significant 
new obligations on MS4 operators as point source polluters.llQ 
These regulations pose many new challenges for local govern- 
ments, not the least of which is that local land use ordinances 
must be updated to reflect the new requirements.120 
118. Id. a t  847 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
119. 6 N.Y.C.R.R. ~ t .  750-1 (2003). auailable at  htt~Y/www.dec.state.nv.us/website/ 
regs/subpart750~01.~tml. 
120. Acting t h r o u h  the DEC, New York State collaborated closely with regional 
EPA agents to draft two types of pollution discharge permits-construction site per- 
mits and MS4 permits-that primarily govern stormwater pollution control in the  
state. The permits require the development and implementation of erosion and sedi- 
ment control regulations and of procedures for site plan review and site inspection 
and enforcement. See N.Y. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, SPDES General Permit for 
Stormwater Discharges from Municipal Separate Stormwater Sewer Systems (MS4sj, 
Permit No. GP-02-02 (January 8, 2003) Part  IV(C)(4)(b) hereinafter Permit No. GP- 
02-02], auailable at  http://www.dec.state.ny.us/website/dow/MS4Permit.pdf; see also 
N.Y. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, Stormwater Phase IIPermits, httpY1www.dec.state. 
ny.us/website/dow/PhaseII.html (last visited June  11, 2006). 
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Shortly after the issuance of its Phase I1 stormwater regula- 
tions, officials within the DEC resolved to chart a n  innovative 
course to secure local compliance. This approach was informed by 
their understanding that to require local governments to amend 
their zoning and land use regulations violates a bedrock political 
norm: local home rule.121 In this respect, the fact that EPA regu- 
lations mandate state compliance and the federal courts back the 
legality of the point source requirements was incidental to the po- 
litical and programmatic reality: Forcing local governments to act 
was destined to meet local resistance and jeopardize its success. 
Within DEC, the Division of Water was responsible for Phase 
I1 implementation in  the state.lZ2 The Division decided to begin 
by providing needed technical assistance to local governments. It 
drafted a Model Stormwater Management and Erosion and Sedi- 
ment Control Ordinance as a guide to the local governments re- 
quired to comply with Phase I1 requirements.lZ3 The model law 
incorporated by reference two documents that contain stormwater 
control standards and best management practices. These include 
the New York State Stormwater Design Manua1,124 promulgated 
in  2001 with the technical assistance of the Center for Watershed 
Protection, and the New York State Standards and Specifications 
for Erosion and Sediment Control, issued in  2004.lZ5 
With grant funding secured from the New England Interstate 
Water Pollution Control Commission, the DEC retained a law 
school land use center to review the model ordinance for sensitiv- 
ity to local land use practice and protocols in New York.lZ6 This 
121. See N.Y. CONST. a r t  IX g 2. 
122. See N.Y. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, Div. of Water, New York State DEC 
Stormwater Information, http://www.dec.state.ny.u~/~eb~ite/d~~/mainpag.htm (last 
visited June  11, 2006). 
123. N.Y. DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, STORMWATER MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE 
MANUAL FOR LOCAL OFFICIALS: MODEL LOCAL LAW FOR STORMWATER MANAGEMENT 




125. Capital Dist. Reg'l Plan. Comm'n, Phase I1 Water Quality Information: New 
York State  Standards and Specifications for Erosion and Sediment Control (2004), 
http~/llcdrpc.net/WQ/erosandsed.html (last visited June  12, 2006). 
126. The Land Use Law Center a t  Pace University School of Law. The author is 
the  founder, former director, and current counsel to the  Center. Any assertions in 
this  part not supported by citations are based on the  author's December 16, 2005 
interview with Sean F. Nolon, Director of the Land Use Law Center, who coordinated 
the  Phase I1 and Estuary initiatives described here. 
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review led to significant changes in  the ordinance to ensure that i t  
was consistent with current local procedures for reviewing and ap- 
proving development proposals that generate stormwater runoff. 
As amended, the model fit the practices employed by most New 
York cities, towns, and villages to review site plan and subdivision 
proposals and applications for special use permits. 
The DEC also administers the Hudson River Estuary Pro- 
gram,lZ7 which is  charged with protecting the Hudson River, a sig- 
nificant estuary that originates north of Albany and flows through 
the Hudson River Valley discharging into the Atlantic Ocean 
south of Manhattan. The Estuary Program was established to 
protect the ecosystems of the extensive watersheds of tributary 
streams and rivers flowing into the Hudson River. This objective, 
like that of stormwater management, depends on the cooperation 
of local governments through the exercise of their state-delegated 
land use control. The officials who operate the Estuary Program 
immediately saw the wisdom of coordinating its efforts with that 
of the stormwater program. This initiative linked the state's Es- 
tuary Program with the state's administration of the Phase I1 Pro- 
gram in  a clever and practical way. 
With funds provided through state environmental bond acts, 
this same law school land use center was retained by the DEC to 
help i t  create a demonstration program in  communities in  a criti- 
cal watershed area of the state.lZ8 The objective of the program 
was to create a process leading to the adoption of the model ordi- 
nance by strategically placed municipalities and to use this suc- 
cess as a model for the ordinance's adoption in  other Hudson River 
127. Established under the  Hudson River Estuary Management Act, N.Y. ENVTL. 
CONSERV. LAW g 11-0306 (Consol. 2006). The program area runs from the  Troy Dam 
south to  the Verrazano Narrows. See N.Y. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, The Hudson 
River Estuary Program, http://www.dec.state.ny.us/website/huddp.html (last 
visited June  12, 2006). 
128. See Press Release, New York State  Executive Chamber, Governor: $1 Million 
to  Protect and Enhance Hudson River (October 1,  2003), auailable at  http://www.ny. 
gov/governor/press/03/0ctl~4~03.htm. 
New York State  has  committed approximately $190 million for implemen- 
tation of priorities in  the  Hudson River Estuary Action Plan, including 
funds from the $1.75 billion 1996 Clean WaterIClean Air Bond Act and 
the Environmental Protection Fund (EPF). Since 1995, more than  $1.4 
billion in Bond Act funding has  been committed statewide for more than  
2,000 important environmental projects. In  tha t  same time, more than  $1 
billion in EPF funding has  been committed to more than 3,600 environ- 
mental projects throughout the  State. 
Id. 
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Estuary communities.12g The communities selected were the 
Town of Wallkill and the City of Middletown, located within the 
town but with their own independent legal jurisdiction and land 
use control. These communities contain a significant portion of 
the watershed of the Wallkill River, which runs from the New 
Jersey Highlands in  northern New Jersey to the northeast 
through Rockland, Orange, and Ulster counties and then dis- 
charges into the Hudson River ninety miles north of Manhat- 
tan.130 It was important to the DEC that the demonstration 
communities were located adjacent to each other jurisdictionally 
to create another critical linkage: Stormwater respects no munici- 
pal boundaries, and for i t  to be controlled effectively, in- 
termunicipal cooperation is  required. The DEC requires that MS4 
operators ensure that their stormwater discharges do not increase 
the discharge of pollutants regulated under the TMDL program 
into any water listed as impaired under section 303(d) of the 
Clean Water Act, advancing, through this additional linkage, the 
objectives of the TMDL initiative.131 
The law school land use law center began its work by collect- 
ing and analyzing all of the land use control laws of the city and 
the town to confirm that the model ordinance conformed to local 
practices for the issuance of special permits and the approval of 
site plan and subdivision app1icati0ns.l~~ Working with 
stormwater outreach specialists of the DEC, the center made a 
number of direct contacts with local officials. The center began by 
contacting the official in  charge of the local department of public 
works asking for reports on the damage caused by previous storm 
events and the costs to the municipalities of those events. In both 
cases, the damage and the costs were alarming. 
With the help of key local leaders who had graduated from the 
center's four-day Land Use Leadership Alliance (LULA) Training 
Program, representatives of the center and DEC secured appoint- 
129. The importance of encouraging successes by demonstration communities is 
explained in John R. Nolon, Champions of Change: Reinventing Democracy Through 
Land Law Reform, 30 HAW. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2006) The article examines empirical 
evidence of how change occurs within communities and explains how that  change 
spreads among peers into other communities. 
130. WALLKILL RIVER WATERSHED MANAGEMENT PLAN, http://www.shawangunk. 
orgIWaterMgmtPln5-0l.doc (last visited June 12, 2006). 
131. Permit No. GP-02-02, supra note 120. 
132. LAND USE LAW CENTER, CITY OF MIDDLETOWN ZONING ORDINANCE DIGEST 
(July 2004) (on file with author); TOWN OF WALLKILL ZONING ORDINANCE DIGEST (Aug. 
2004) (on file with author). 
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ments with the chief elected leaders of the city and town to discuss 
the challenges and opportunities presented by stormwater man- 
agement and the model ordinance. It held meetings with the 
planning boards and zoning boards of both communities, whose 
initial concerns over having to administer yet another law were 
assuaged by the way in which the model law fit into and comple- 
mented their existing regulations. Following this preliminary 
work, meetings were held with the elected members of the legisla- 
tive bodies of both communities and follow-up correspondence 
sent.133 These meetings were structured as facilitated discussions 
where the legislators were encouraged to ask questions about the 
Phase I1 Program, express their concerns, review the model ordi- 
nance, and otherwise discuss the advantages and disadvantages 
of adopting it. 
Initially, the legislators admitted to having little knowledge of 
the Phase I1 Program and requirements. After these meetings, 
concerned over the practical effects of stormwater runoff to the 
municipalities and impressed by the positive recommendations of 
their engineering consultants, both legislatures decided to begin 
the process of formal adoption of the model ordinance. The lead- 
ers of the town government, in  fact, saw advantages in  making 
their local law more stringent than the state model because of a n  
unfavorable circumstance they had experienced with particular 
sites. They added a provision, among others, that withholds a cer- 
tificate of occupancy from any new development until the devel- 
oper has successfully established vegetative cover on all disturbed 
s 0 i 1 s . l ~ ~  The city, in turn, agreed to adopt this town-initiated 
amendment to ensure consistency in  its regulation of the commu- 
133. The legal authority for local compliance with Phase I1 regulations, the details 
of the  model ordinance, and benefits of adopting i t  were summarized in a memoran- 
dum submitted to  the  Middletown City Council on Oct. 14, 2004 (on file with the  
author). It  begins "The Land Use Law Center is pleased to assist the  City of Mid- 
dletown a s  it moves forward with its Stormwater Phase I1 compliance program" (em- 
phasis added). The Center also drafted a Resolution of Legislative Intent for the  city, 
which was adopted. The resolution expressed the  Council's intent to adopt the  model 
law, directed the steps precedent to tha t  adoption, and committed the  city to coordi- 
nating its stormwater management program with tha t  of the Town of Wallkill. Simi- 
lar technical assistance and information was provided to public officials in  the Town 
of Wallkill (source on file with author). 
134. Memorandum from Comm'n for Conservation of the  Env't to Town Ed. of the  
Town of Wallkill, app. g XI11 (June 14, 2005), auailable at http://www.townofwallkill. 
com/pd£lWallkillManor.pdf. 
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nities' common watershed.135 As of this writing, the process of 
adopting the amended model law is  progressing smoothly in  both 
communities. 
Additional horizontal and vertical linkages exist within the 
DEC stormwater management program. It provides financial as- 
sistance to local governments for Water Quality Improvement 
Grant Projects as a n  incentive for compliance and a further means 
of achieving locally desired water quality.13'j The DEC has hired 
and deployed Stormwater Outreach Specialists to assist local offi- 
cials in  the adoption of stormwater pollution programs and regula- 
tions. These specialists conduct workshops for local officials 
explaining the requirements and intricacies of the state and fed- 
eral regulations, the benefits to municipalities of complying, and 
the success of the demonstration projects. The state has also pro- 
duced guidebooks and other materials to aid municipal officials in  
understanding, adopting, and implementing stormwater regula- 
t i o n ~ . ~ ~ ~  The DEC Division of Water is acutely aware of the 
TMDL Program.138 By requiring MS4s that discharge into im- 
paired section 303(d) water bodies to conform their stormwater 
management programs to the requirements of existing or future 
approved T M D L S , ~ ~ ~  i t  has created a critical linkage administra- 
tively a t  the state level between federal environmental 
initiatives.140 
135. See id. a t  app. g X(B)(2) (''The Planning Board may require the  following ad- 
ditional information . . . a) A wetland delineation report in accordance with the  stan- 
dards set forth in this ordinance (identification of hydrophytic vegetation."). 
136. See Press Release, N.Y. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, DEC: Grants Available 
for Water Quality Improvement Projects (Jan. 28, 2005), http://www.dec.state.ny.us/ 
website/press/pressre1/2005/200507.html (last visited June  13, 2006) (discussing the  
$20 million tha t  the DEC is making available to municipalities for water quality im- 
provement projects). 
137. See N.Y. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, Stormwater Toolbox for the  SPDES 
General Permit for Stormwater Discharges from Construction Activities, h t tp f l  
www.dec.state.ny.u~/~eb~ite/d0~/t001b0x/t001b0~.htm (last visited June  13, 2006). 
138. The DEC General Permit itself describes TMDLs as  "a key tool in the work to  
clean up polluted waters." Permit No. GP-02-02, supra note 120, a t  n.6; see d s o  N.Y. 
Dep't of Envtl. Consemation, Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs), h t tp f l  
www.dec.state.ny.u~/~eb~ite/d~~/tmdl.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2006) (discussing 
requirements of Clean Water Act g 303(d)(l)(C)). 
139. Permit No. GP-02-02, supra note 120; The N.Y. State FINAL 2004 Section 
303(dj List ofImpaired Waters Requiring a TMDL (Sept. 24,2004), auaZable at  ht tpf l  
www.dec.state.ny.us/website/dow/303dlist.pdf. 
140. See generally N.Y. Dep't of Envtl. Consemation, New York State  "Phase I1 
Storm Water Program" Frequently Asked Questions (2003), http://www.dec.state.ny. 
us/website/dow/too1b0x/m~4t001b0x/m~4fa~.pdf (last visited June  13, 2006). 
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V. CONCLUSION: INTEGRATED FEDERALISM 
Reflexive law regimes, in  addition to integrating the influ- 
ences of multiple levels of government, involve the private actors 
who are affected by governmental regulation. In the administra- 
tion of the New York Stormwater Management Program, this is 
accomplished through reliance on municipal implementation. By 
emphasizing the adoption of a local law, the DEC program incor- 
porates the entire apparatus of local land use law decision-making 
in  the administration of a federal environmental law program. 
New York's local land use legal system relies on work sessions of 
the legislative body, open meetings, public notices of pending leg- 
islation, public hearings, local agency review of regulated projects, 
and the right to challenge adopted laws in  the courts: a full spec- 
trum of opportunities for citizen and stakeholder participation.141 
The neighbors who object to stormwater-generating projects 
and the developers who propose them are included in  and bene- 
fited by these processes. In reflexive law terms, local officials are 
influenced by the reflections of all those directly affected by 
stormwater controls. Local land use laws in New York, and in  
most states, must conform to the comprehensive plan, which re- 
quires citizen participation in  its creation.142 The adoption of local 
laws, such as the New York model ordinance, requires citizen par- 
ticipation, which ensures the exposure of local lawmakers to the 
opinions and interests of the full range of affected parties.143 
Even the approval of a regulated project, whose compliance with 
the newly adopted stormwater management law is a t  issue, re- 
quires open meetings, public notice, and public hearings: addi- 
141. See JOHN R. NOLON, WELL GROUNDED: USING LOCAL LAND USE AUTHORITY TO 
ACHIEVE SMART GROWTH 95-96 (2001). 
The procedures t h a t .  . . [local governments] must follow are governed. . . 
by state statutes tha t  delegate . . . the  power to award variances, approve 
site plans and subdivisions, or award special use permits. These statutes 
must be consulted to determine whether a public hearing is required, how 
notice of the  hearing is to be given, the  time by which a decision must be 
rendered, how the  decision is to be filed, and who may appeal a local deci- 
sion to  the  courts. The local legislature may establish additional proce- 
dures tha t  must be followed by local boards. 
Id. 
142. N.Y. TOWN LAW g 272-a (Consol. 2006); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW g 7-722 (Consol. 
2006); N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW g 28-a (Consol. 2006). 
143. See N.Y. DEP'T OF STATE, Dm. OF LOCAL GOV'T SVCS., ADOPTING LOCAL AWS IN 
NEW YORK STATE, 13-14, auaZable at http~/www.dos.state.ny.us/lgss/pdfs/1ocallaw. 
pdf. 
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tional opportunities to reflect on the impacts and effects caused in  
the fine tuning of stormwater protection.144 
At the outset, this article raised questions regarding govern- 
mental jurisdiction over stormwater management, disaster miti- 
gation, wetlands controls, transportation planning, and a host of 
other critical land use and environmental matters. Katrina's la- 
ment concerns the federal system and our flawed search for a pre- 
eminent authority in these matters. Federal jurisdiction is 
limited, both constitutionally and practically: There are certain 
distances beyond which Congress cannot or will not travel to pro- 
tect national interests in  water quality. State legislators, too, al- 
though vested with plenary police powers to protect state interests 
of all sorts, often do not act in  the absence of a federal influence or 
will not pay the political price of requiring local governments to 
adopt onerous land use regulations. Meanwhile, local officials 
know that their much-touted home rule powers do not give them 
control over the many intermunicipal and regional influences that 
frustrate their efforts to create quality communities.145 
As administered by the New York State Department of Envi- 
ronmental Conservation, a state agency acting in  response to a 
federal mandate, the Stormwater Protection Program created new 
opportunities for exercising local power that local officials came to 
view as advantageous to them and their constituents. As imple- 
mented, the state program respected local autonomy and went on 
to inform and assist local officials in  complying with a federal ini- 
tiative. By embracing the local regulatory system as its implemen- 
tation device, the program opened itself up to influence by 
neighbors incensed by recent flooding of their properties, local and 
regional watershed and environmental leaders, and regulated 
landowners and developers. 
This integrated approach to addressing local, state, and fed- 
eral interests in  water quality is succeeding because it wastes no 
144. See NOLON, supra note 141; see d s o  N.Y. Prm. OFF. LAW, $ $  100-111 (Consol. 
2006). New York has adopted an  environmental review statute modeled on the federal 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. $$ 4321-4347 (2000). New 
York's State Environmental Quality Act (SEQRA) is found a t  N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. 
LAW $$ 8-0101 to 8-0117 (Consol. 2006). The SEQRA regulations are found a t  6 
N.Y.C.R.R. pt. 617, auaZable at http~/www.dec.state.ny.us/website/reg~/part617. 
html. New York is one of the relatively few states in which local governments "are 
authorized or required to conduct environmental reviews." NOLON, supra note 141, a t  
183. 
145. See John R. Nolon, The Erosion of Home Rule Through the Emergence of 
State~Interests in Land Use Control, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 497, 562 (1993). 
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time arguing over supremacy, states rights, and home rule, but 
rather problem solves using the resources of all levels of govern- 
ment: federal standards, state technical assistance, and local reg- 
ulatory systems. It demonstrates how to help localities 
understand their role as a n  essential component in  a larger, inte- 
grated system of law. 
This exposes a seeming blind spot in  the TMDL and some 
other federal environmental programs: the critical importance of 
embracing local participation, especially where the historic au- 
thority of localities to regulate land use is implicated. Local gov- 
ernments are the first responders when disaster strikes and have 
been delegated significant legal authority to regulate land devel- 
opment. In the last decade, the advent of local environmental law 
has demonstrated the potential of local regulators as effective 
partners in  protecting environmental functions and natural re- 
sources.14'j This insight suggests that federal regulatory schemes 
should complete the vertical dimension of a national framework of 
law by working closely with local governments. 
The New York success with stormwater management, how- 
ever, would not have occurred but for the stimulus of the federal 
government through its promulgation of stormwater management 
regulations, its cooperative federalist partnership with the state, 
and its expectation that state and local governments are coequally 
interested in  the matter a t  hand. The current emphasis on a new 
type of federalism,l47 which argues against strong action by the 
central government for fear of damaging local autonomy, gravely 
underestimates the importance of federal standards and impera- 
tives in a n  integrated national system of law. 
146. See John R. Nolon, I n  Praise of Parochialism: The Advent of Local Enuiron~ 
mental Law, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 372-73 (2002). 
147. See generally David J .  Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 
DUKE L.J. 377 (2001) (advocating "[tlhe notion that  more governmental decisions 
could and should be handled locally."). 
